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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 9400318-CA 
CHRISTOPHER J. SOLOMON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
The following reply is made to Respondent's Brief filed 
April 18, 1995. The respondent has made a number of arguments 
in opposition to those raised by Appellant. Although Appellant 
argued only two points of law in his Brief, Respondent replied 
with ten separate subdivisions. Moreover, no attempt has been 
made by the respondent to specifically relate its arguments to 
the pages contained in the Brief of Appellant. For this reason, 
therefore, Appellant will assume that all points except for No. 
3 stated in Respondent's Brief apply to Appellant's First Point 
of Law and that Point 3 relates solely to Appellant's Second 
Point of Law. 
For the convenience of the Court, therefore, Appellant will 
refer to the specific arguments made by the respondent in the 
same order that they are addressed. Rather than rephrasing the 
arguments in Appellant's favor, the argument made by Repondent 
will merely be repeated in order to avoid further confusion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A SUFFICIENT WARNING 
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING A BLOOD 
DRAW TO SATISFY CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 1 ARGUMENT: "Where a DUI Suspect is 
Arrested the Government Has no Affirmative Duty to Show 
Consent." (Respondent's Brief at 9-11). 
Respondent argues that "where a DUI suspect is under 
arrest, the government has no affirmative duty to show consent 
to submit to a BAC test, because such consent is implied by 
law." (Respondent's Brief at 9). The respondent, however, has 
confused the terms of "consent" with the concept of "refusal". 
It is clear under Section 41-6-44.10 that an officer must 
explain to an arrested person that he requests that an alcohol 
or blood sample be given. Moreover, he must inform the person 
that if he "refuses" to submit to the test then he may lose his 
license to operate a motor vehicle. Subsections (2),(a), (b), 
(f), (3), and (8) all refer to the term "refused" or "refusal". 
Clearly, even in the civil context of administrative 
license hearings, the question of "refusal" is one of the issues 
to be determined. [§41-6-44.10(2) (f) (ii)] . "Refusal is defined 
as declining to accept or submit to a command." Webster's New 
World Dictionary, 2d Ed. p. 1195. Thus, the "implied consent" 
is only effective until the point in time when the defendant 
"refuses" to comply. When a defendant chooses to refuse then 
the implied consent is revoked. 
If a person has the right to refuse to a breath or blood 
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test, then that person must be given sufficient information upon 
which to make a determination of refusal. The government has a 
statutory and constitutional duty to inform that person 
sufficiently to allow the implied consent to continue or be 
revoked. The failure to clearly inform an arrested driver as to 
his right of refusal can quite correctly be said to have also 
been a failure to inform the driver as to his right to continue 
the implied consent. Regardless of the linguistic niceties, the 
statute requires a duty of the arresting officer as to the 
defendant and therefore the respondent's argument that no duty 
is required on the part of the government to show "consent" is 
totally groundless. Clearly, if a defendant is not properly 
informed or is informed falsely as to the consequences of the 
testing, then his "consent" is not valid because he was not 
properly informed of his right to "refusal" which is clearly 
required. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 2 ARGUMENT: "Defendant's Hearing 
Impairment Does Not Constitute Withdrawal of His Implied 
Consent." (Respondent's Brief at 11-13). 
Appellant would agree that per se a hearing impaired person 
does not receive an automatic advantage over a person with 
normal hearing. However, Utah law contrary to the law of 
Georgia requires that a person be informed that he does have a 
choice to refuse to take the breath or chemical test. If a 
person has not been properly informed of this right to refuse 
because of a language problem or hearing problem, then under 
Utah law that person has been denied their right of refusal 
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contained in Section 41-6-44.10, U.C.A. 
The Utah Legislature recognized that a person is not 
constitutionally required to consent to any chemical or breath 
test as to a criminal prosecution and therefore devised the 
present system to encourage a voluntary submission of such test 
at the threat of civilly losing a driver's license. Interest of 
R.L.I., 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah App. 1989). Regardless of what may 
be said as to civil proceedings involving refusal and suspension 
of a driverfs license. Constitutional criminal rights cannot be 
waived or discarded if a person is not fully informed of the 
consequences of their refusal. 
The state argues that Section 41-6-41.10(3), U.C.A. is 
applicable to this case on the theory that a person who is deaf 
is equivalent to a person who is "dead, unconscious, or in any 
other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to 
any chemical test." It would be interesting for the prosecutor 
to make this argument to a handicap association of deaf persons 
effectively telling them that they are entitled to no more 
rights than a dead person. 
The aforesaid statute was designed to cover situations in 
which injured or totally intoxicated persons unable to knowingly 
make decisions regarding refusal could be administered the test 
in order to preserve necessary evidence of blood alcohol content 
especially in cases involving death and serious injury. This 
statute was never designed to excuse police officers from making 
a good faith attempt in communicating with hearing impaired 
individuals, people speaking other languages, or other 
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communication disabilities that have nothing to do with physical 
or mental incapacity. 
Essentially, Respondent is requesting this Court to excuse 
police officers from making any effort to communicate to this 
special class of individuals that the statutory admonition 
requires. Under Respondent's theory, any Spanish-speaking 
defendant could be physically forced to give blood with no 
effort being required to obtain an interpreter to explain the 
procedures and consequences. Such a result is absurd and would 
violate all constitutional criminal law protections against 
defendants regardless of their handicap or language ability. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 3 ARGUMENT: "Officer Newren Met His 
Duties Under the Implied Consent Law." (Respondent's Brief at 
15-19) . 
If it is assumed arguendo that Officer Newren sufficiently 
conveyed the necessary civil warnings to the defendant 
concerning the loss of his license if he refused to submit to 
the test, then the arguments made by Respondent are correct as 
to the civil proceeding and civil requirement. However, 
Appellant in his brief has contended that a defendant must also 
be warned in the crminal context that any evidence obtained from 
the blood draw could be used against him in a criminal 
conviction and furthermore that any refusal to allow a blood 
draw could also be used in a criminal trial against him. The 
latter requirement is specifically spelled out in 
§41-6-44.10(8), U.C.A. (Appellant's Brief at 12-13). Since the 
present context of this appeal is a criminal prosecution and not 
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an administrative proceeding as to license suspension, the 
argument as to whether Officer Newren correctly complied with 
the civil standard is only of secondary interest in light of the 
other arguments requiring a defendant to be sufficiently 
informed of his rights of refusal in the criminal context. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 4 ARGUMENT: "Non-compliance With Section 
41-6-44.10 Does Not Render Chemical Test Results Inadmissible in 
a Criminal Proceeding. (Respondent's Brief at 19-25). 
The discussion by the respondent relating to this issue is 
accurate but irrelevant. This is not a case in which the wrong 
type of test was administered or where defendant was not 
properly offered a choice of tests as in the cases cited by the 
respondent in its brief. Instead, the sole issue in this case 
is whether Defendant was properly warned by the officer in the 
context of a criminal prosecution that he had the right to 
refuse a blood test or that such refusal could be used against 
him in a criminal prosecution. 
The cases cited by Respondent hold that the procedures for 
the civil revocation of a license and that for a criminal 
prosecution are not necessarily dependent upon one another. 
Thus, if a person has been found to voluntarily consent to a 
blood draw after a proper constitutional warning was given, such 
draw can be used in a criminal case even though the test itself 
may turn out to be deficient for revoking the person's license. 
Conversely, a person may be properly informed as to the civil 
liability for failing to take a blood test which therefore 
renders his license suspendable and yet not fully be informed 
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foi purposes of a criminal prosecution as to the question of 
informed consent. 
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the respondent simply adds more confusion to this already 
muddled area of law. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 5 ARGUMENT: "The Rules of Evidence Did 
Not Preclude Admission of Defendant's Blood Test." (Respondent 
Brief at 25). 
Defendant's counsel stipulated that were the technicians 
called to testify in the trial, they would testify that 
Defendant's blood test showed a .15% of alcohol content. As 
correctly noted by Respondent, no evidentiary objection was made 
in this case since the issue was not the accuracy of the blood 
test, but simply whether the blood test should be admitted at 
all because of the failure to provide constitutional warnings to 
the defendant. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 6 ARGUMENT: "Defendant's Constitutional 
Right to be Free From Unreasonable Search and Seizure Was Not 
Violated." (Respondent's Brief at 26-28). 
Again, Defendant does not disagree with the authorities 
cited by the respondent concerning circumstances in which a 
forced blood draw can be in compliance with the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. This issue, however, only 
becomes relevant when a defendant has refused to give proper 
consent to a blood draw. In State v. Kruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah 
1968) the driver of an automobile was involved in a serious 
accident and was taken to a hospital for examination. At the 
hospital Kruz was asked by investigating officers to submit to a 
blood test to determine the alcohol content of his blood. At 
that time he was not yet arrested. Kruz refused to submit to 
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RESPONDENT'S POINT " iRGUMENI defendant's Mjranda Rights 
Were No*- Violated " (Respondent ' Q Rri-f • • 29). 
R e - p " n d - \ e i: t s t h a t c a s e t h e ?: e :i s i \ o 
_g_ 
record evidence showing Defendant ever asked about Miranda." 
(Respondent's Brief at 29). This is true. However, there is 
also no record evidence that a Miranda warning was ever given 
to the defendant at the time of his arrest. (Suppression 
Hearing at 6). 
Once again, the respondent has raised a non-issue. 
Defendant is not claiming any deficiency relating to a 
Miranda warning but is instead asserting that constitutional 
due process requires that a defendant be informed not only that 
his refusal to take a blood or breath test can result in the 
revocation of his drivers license, but also that such refusal 
can be introduced as evidence in a criminal prosecution or, in 
the alternative, if the defendant consents then the test results 
can also be introduced. 
It is only when all of these elements are given to a 
defendant that he can make an informed consent as to the license 
revocation proceeding and the search and seizure issue related 
to the criminal prosecution. To only inform the defendant as to 
the negative consequences as to the drivers license and not as 
to the negative consequences as to the crimnal prosecution, 
eliminates the elements of informed consent and voluntariness 
required for a valid breath or blood draw under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 8 ARGUMENT: "Defendant's Right to 
Counsel Was Not Violated." (Respondent's Brief at 29-30). 
Defendant does not contest this argument of Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT 9 ARGUMENT: "Even if Defendant Did Not 
-10-
C *r .^ * 5 '-AC Test Was Admissible. ' (Respondent's 
Bripf ai *o- Defendant- bplipvpc t-hpt- t-bi^  T s merely a 
rewording of Pespondent 'c; rrj"r ar^ i^ irpt ' ^ nrprni ng search and 
s * '-a therefore refers the 
Court > Defendan* ' • iesponser supra. 
II, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PROPER WA RNINGS 
WERE GIVEN TO THE DEFENDANT, THE LOWER 
COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN RULING THAT 
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"thought they had actual consent". (Suppression Hearing at 37). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(Utah 1979) held that in determining whether a defendant has 
consented for purposes of the civil drivers license revocation, 
the circumstances must be looked at objectively in terms of the 
behavior of the driver from a disinterested bystander. 
This same test should be applied in determining consent for 
purposes of the criminal prosecution- Unfortunately, however, 
the lower court did not make the required factual findings 
necessary to make this objective evaluation thereby requiring at 
a minimum a "remand" for a rehearing on this critical issue. 
State v. Sterqer, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991). 
However, Defendant asserts that a factual remand is not 
required since the evidence as painted even most favorably by 
the respondent shows that the defendant was seriously hearing 
impaired, that the officer did not have the standardized written 
consent form which could have been shown to the defendant to 
read, and that the actual consent forms which were signed by the 
defendant were ambiguous and made no mention whatsoever of 
either driver license revocation or criminal prosecution. 
Defendant contends as a matter of law, that the defendant did 
not actually consent to the blood draw. 
The state relied entirely upon voluntary consent for the 
blood test. It did not produce any evidence required under 
Schmerber v. California, supra, allowing a non-consentual 
search and seizure of Defendant's bodily fluids. The Court did 
not address this issue nor was it raised by the parties. Thus, 
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